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2Introduction to Financialisation
1. What is financialisation and why  
 is it important?
Financialisation is a relatively new term, which covers such a wide range of trends that 
it is difficult to define precisely. The most-cited definition, by Gerald Epstein, says that: 
‘financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, 
financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies.’
It is a process in which financial intermediaries and technologies have gained unprecedented 
influence over our daily lives. 
The expansion of financial markets is not only about the volume of financial trading, but 
also the increasing diversity of transactions and market players and their intersection with 
all parts of economy and society. In short, financialisation must be understood as a radical 
transformation within the financial sector that has altered entire economies – from the 
household and the firm to the functioning of monetary systems and commodity markets.
Research has shown that financialisation has increased inequality, slowed down investment 
in ‘real’ production, mounted pressures on indebted households and individuals and led to 
a decline in democratic accountability. 
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32. When did financialisation begin?
While the beginnings of financialisation can be traced back to the 1950s, it was the fall of 
the Bretton Woods monetary system in the early 1970s that accelerated growth in global 
liquidity and prompted a surge of financial liberalisation and deregulation. 
The Bretton Woods agreement anchored international currencies to the US dollar, and 
the fixed the US dollar to gold. This provided predictability in exchange rates and stopped 
gains being made from speculation. The agreements had been established to guard against 
the rise of ‘protectionism’ that had marred the interwar years. This benefited the US as the 
world’s biggest exporter and its ‘reserve currency’. Consequently, the US went on a spending 
spree to fund the Cold War, in particular the Vietnam and Korean wars, as well as to fund 
the Marshall Plan in Europe to help the post-war economies to buy US goods. The US was 
printing more dollars and spending them overseas, which meant that the volume of dollars 
in circulation greatly surpassed the US’s gold reserves, making the dollar–gold link look more 
unsustainable. As concern mounted that excessive US public debt was threatening the fixed 
convertibility of dollars to gold, in 1971, US President Richard Nixon decided unilaterally to 
end dollar–gold convertibility, formally bringing the Bretton Woods agreements to an end. 
What followed was a decade of deregulation of currency movements as the world moved to 
a new regime of free trade in goods, floating exchange rates and free movement of capital. 
Floating exchange rates and unregulated capital flows presented hazards for many, but 
also provided opportunities for financial innovation (such as derivatives) to deal with these 
risks and for speculation to profit from them.
The US, freed from any commitment to maintain dollar–gold convertibility, could now pay 
its debts with its own currency without significant constrictions in supply. The US deficit (the 
amount a country spends compared to how much it earns) increased rapidly and with it 
the number of dollars or dollar-denominated financial assets in circulation, most of which 
ended up in the reserves of other countries’ central banks. Increased reserves allowed these 
banks to expand credit in their own economies and world liquidity surged.
This opened up new profit-making possibilities in private financial markets, and those 
seeking to capitalise pushed for the dismantling of barriers to capital mobility and other 
regulations that limited their activities.
43. How has the financial sector changed?
Since the 1970s, the value of global financial assets has soared. Not only have financial 
markets grown in absolute terms, they have also expanded in relative terms: the value 
of global financial transactions rapidly surpassed that of ‘real’ production business and 
commerce (see graphic 1). For example, in 1973, the ratio of the value of foreign exchanges in 
transactions to global trade was 2:1; in 2004 this ratio reached 90:1. By 2017, the total value of 
global trade was $17.88 trillion a year. That compares with foreign exchange transactions of 
$5.1 trillion a day.  
New technology has played a critical role in the expansion of finance. For example, 
computerised trading is said to account for around 70 per cent of financial ‘market activity’ 
in the US and just below 40 per cent in Europe. High-frequency trading, as it is known, uses 
algorithms to sell or buy financial assets in fractions of seconds. While in the 1960s, shares 
were held for about four years, today ‘the average share’ is ‘held for around 20 seconds’. 
Information technology also facilitated ‘credit scoring’ and computational statistical models 
that enabled mass lending, previously hampered by banks’ reliance on time-consuming 
personalised credit risk assessments.
In the process, banking changed dramatically. Most no longer fit the vision most people 
have of a local bank providing services of loans and savings for individuals and businesses. 
Modern banking involves loans being repackaged, sold and traded, and speculation in global 
markets. Financialisation has seen the emergence of new types of financial institutions 
(such as the shadow banking system, or SBS) and practices (for example, securitisation) 
that are not subject to the same regulations as traditional commercial banks. Shadow 
banking broadly accounts for $160 trillion assets worldwide, almost half the $340 trillion 
of total financial assets globally. Despite discussion about the need to rein in the SBS in 
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, it has grown even bigger. The massive growth in 
speculative trading has led some to describe today’s financial markets as a global casino.
Financialisation has driven the great expanse of debt that has come to define the world 
economy. In 2014, the consulting firm McKinsey’s estimated that world debt stood at 
$199 trillion, 287 per cent of global GDP.
54. What are some of the key processes and  
 practices that characterise contemporary  
 financialisation?
Financialisation includes a variety of practices and processes. Since the end of the Bretton 
Woods agreement, it has become much easier for money to flow across borders. Domestic 
restrictions on financial flows have also been lifted. This has meant that banks have found 
it easier to lend more (increase their assets) and to borrow more (increase their liabilities). 
The gradual transformation in finance has come from banks innovating in both areas, 
unlocking ever more liquidity in the process.
Lend first then go to markets to fund it 
Banks, like individuals and households, must be able to cover the daily cash balance. To 
ensure that their customers can always withdraw their cash from a bank, the bank needs to 
be sure it has cash coming in. This could be met from reserves (our deposits), by borrowing 
cash from the central bank, or – as became crucial – by borrowing on the open markets 
from other banks. Previously, many banks managed this balance by expanding the pool 
of reserves (through a network of branches) and, as necessary, by borrowing from central 
banks. Since the late 1960s, however, banks have increasingly relied on borrowing on the 
open market. This has been described as market-based banking and flipped finance on 
its head: banks now lend first (expanding the asset side of their balance sheets), and then 
go to money markets to fund their liquidity constraints (the liability side). 
Sell now, pay later
Another key change is the rise of securitisation. It was described by a British newspaper, 
The Guardian, as the ‘crack cocaine of the financial services’ sector. Securitisation is the 
transformation of streams of future income into a financial security ready to sell immediately. 
To give one example: rather than wait for year after year for royalties on his records, David 
Bowie sold a financial security – a Bowie Bond – that investors could buy. Bowie received 
the money immediately, the investor received the royalties year on year. Securitisation can 
be applied to anything with a regular income: mortgages, student loans, water services, 
road tolls, telephone bills, migrants’ remittances, export earnings, wages of a sports star, 
tax revenues, or even ‘sustainable’ forest management. It means that rather than waiting 
25 years for a student loan to be repaid, for example, the loan company can sell off the rights 
to the repayment (at a discount) and get the money back straight away.
This has two main effects. First, securitisation means that financial actors are forever looking 
for new sources of future income to transform. The game is to find assets and bundle them 
6up in a way that (allegedly, at least) makes their income predictable and steady. Investors 
in securities like these, however, are essentially speculating: nobody can be sure Bowie will 
remain popular, just as nobody could be sure that subprime mortgages would be repaid. 
Second, securitisation means there is no time to waste in issuing new loans. If a bank 
lends a company £1m and expects £100,000 back a year, rather than wait 10 years for its 
loanable funds to be replenished, it can sell a security for £900,000 straight away, and carry 
on lending. This means there is much more liquidity, allowing greater levels of borrowing 
in the economy.
Future-flow securitisations allow public and private entities access to low-cost credit in 
global capital markets, detached from official credit ratings and the government’s economic 
performance (e.g. foreign exchange reserve levels). Proponents of these processes argue 
that they are based on sophisticated computer models and help to spread and balance 
risk. However, the assumptions used in these models (based on past prices) do not hold in 
unprecedented times of crisis when prices of different assets move in the same direction. In 
practice, these risk-management techniques make financial players act en masse in similar 
ways, increasing instability and the likelihood of large price swings. The subprime mortgage 
crisis was a perfect example of the dangers of securitisation.
> For further details of link between securitisation and US financial crisis see Q&A 13.
5. Who are the main actors?
Investment Banks act as market intermediaries, offering financial services to large firms. 
For example, if a property developer wants to build a number of luxury housing blocks in 
London, it needs to find the capital to buy the land, sponsor the development, and advertise 
the investment. To raise this capital, it will go to an investment bank that will help the 
company develop a financial security and sell this security to investors. Investment banks will 
often ‘underwrite’ the offerings of these securities. They also engage in ‘trading’, i.e. buying 
financial instruments for the short term in order to sell on to others. The famous names of 
banking like Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse are all primarily investment banks 
and stand at the apex of global finance.
In contrast, Commercial Banking or Retail Banking was traditionally about taking deposits 
and lending to consumers and businesses. These are the names more familiar on the high 
street like HSBC or NatWest in the UK or Bank of America in the US. 
From the 1960s, the separation between deposit-taking retail banks and investment banks 
began to blur. An increasing number of retail banks raised money not from deposits but 
from the open market. Similarly, investment banks merged with deposit-taking banks so 
they also had access to deposits. Today’s banks act more like Banking Conglomerates than 
specialists in either commercial or investment banking. 
7This mixing of investment and commercial banking had been forbidden in the US by the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 after the Great Depression. The Act was formally repealed 
in 1999 but by then financial innovation had already muddied the distinction. After the 
crisis, President Obama implemented the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act that attempted to protect depositors from the risky activities undertaken 
by the ‘investment’ side of conglomerate banking activities. Other countries, like Germany, 
which had traditionally separated retail and investment banking, have found it increasingly 
difficult to maintain a strict distinction because of the way market-based banking means 
that banks of all kinds now rely on wholesale money markets as much as customer deposits. 
Shadow banking institutions such as hedge funds, mutual funds and structured investment 
vehicles do not take deposits, but like commercial banks, they provide credit-type services 
to other banks and large companies. In that sense, shadow institutions are similar to 
investment banks, but differ from them since they operate in the shadows without 
government regulation and monitoring. Many regulated commercial and investment banks 
engage in unregulated shadow banking activities, such as through subsidiaries. Because 
shadow banks are not regulated in the same way as normal investment and commercial 
banks, they can often raise and lend money more easily, though with substantially more 
risk. Shadow banks are, almost by definition, not well-known but include names such as 
Bridgewater Associates, Vanguard and Cheyne SIV.
Institutional investors are financial firms or organisations – including pension, hedge and 
mutual funds, investment banks and insurance companies – that trade and/or hold large 
quantities of financial assets. Institutional investors buy financial securities (bonds and 
stocks) directly, allowing companies to bypass banks when looking for funding. In the UK and 
the US, institutional investors now own or manage around 70 per cent of the stock market. 
Institutional investors not only concentrate market power, but also typically have short-term 
horizons (for example, fund managers are often judged on quarterly performance) and 
are characterised by ‘herding’ behaviour. The biggest institutional investor in the world is 
BlackRock followed by Vanguard Asset Management. 
Institutional cash pools are an important aspect of shadow banking and institutional 
investors. The cash that large global companies and institutional funds have to hand the 
money that has not been invested in long-term assets – has grown enormously in the last 
few decades. The volume of institutional cash pools rose from $100 billion in 1990 to over 
$2.2 trillion at their peak in 2007, before falling slightly after the crisis but then rising again 
once more. This cash has been a key source of short-term liquidity in the financial system. 
Rather than being deposited in the normal Central Bank-backed banks, it is deposited in the 
shadow banking sector. It then becomes a key part of the way most banks access money 
to finance further loans. 
8Impacts of financialisation  
on the economy
6. What was the promise of ‘liberalising’  
 capital flows and what has been the reality?
Since the 1980s and 1990s, many governments began to ‘liberalise’ their capital accounts, 
removing barriers to the free flow of capital in and out of the country and allowing for full 
exchange-rate convertibility. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), between 1980 and 2007 international capital flows expanded 
from $500 billion to $12 trillion. During the same time period, foreign exchange (FX) trading 
(the trading of currencies) grew to become the world’s biggest market. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and other institutions had encouraged governments to dismantle 
capital controls, arguing that this would allow for a more efficient allocation of capital and 
thus, encourage economic growth. Developing countries, in particular, were supposed to 
benefit from capital inflows, given that, theoretically, investors would be attracted to the 
higher returns available in ‘capital-scarce’ economies.
Reality has proven quite far removed from the theory. First, there has been no robust 
evidence to support the claim that the liberalisation of capital accounts has positive impacts 
on growth. Second, evidence suggests that free movements of capital have resulted in 
unprecedented volatility of exchange rates, stock market values and interest rates, and 
therefore greater instability, including a greater likelihood of financial crises. Third, in the 
2000s, capital flowed from ‘developing’ to ‘developed’ economies, rather than the other 
way around. 
Short-term speculative interests play a central role in determining the direction of vast 
movements of global capital and as such foreign exchange rates, because flows in or out 
of an economy can change currency values. Instability can follow as investors move their 
money from place to place looking for better returns. A hasty influx of capital may whip up 
a financial bubble, while a sudden outpour can exacerbate or even cause economic crisis. 
Even in the absence of a crisis, capital inflows can have negative economic impacts, such 
as currency appreciation, which increases the price of goods for export that limiting its 
competitiveness. It can also contribute to inflation and come with conditions that limit the 
public policies the government can adopt to protect its population.
9Essentially, countries are vulnerable to crises with external 
origins (at least partially) beyond their control.
CASE STUDY
Speculation ‘insurance’– how foreign exchange 
reserves lead the South to subsidise the North
In response to the capital flow and related exchange rate volatility experienced in 
the 1990s, many countries started to accumulate foreign exchange reserves as a 
‘protection’ strategy. These reserves can be used to defend the exchange rate by 
buying currency on open markets and to counteract other implications of sudden 
capital outflows; for example, the reserves provide a sort of ‘insurance’ against 
default on short-term external debt obligations. A large share of these reserves is 
held as US public debt, reflecting the dominance of the dollar as an international 
currency and the presumed ‘safety’ of US government securities.
Though China is by far the largest holder of foreign reserves, the trend is 
evident across Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa. As a result of this 
international reserve accumulation, net flows to ‘developing’ countries were 
negative between 2000 and 2008. In effect, this means that many low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs) became positive net lenders to wealthy countries – 
principally the US. This reserve accumulation diverts money from productive 
investment and social spending.
7. How has financialisation changed  
 the economic structure?
Financialisation is a shift in the way wealth is accumulated. Whereas in the past profits 
came mainly from the mass production and sale of goods, in our financialised era a large 
proportion of profits come from the buying and selling of financial securities and the interest 
payments they accrue.
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A 17-country study conducted by the International Labour Organization (ILO) found that 
the portion of profits represented by the financial sector rose to over 40 per cent in 2005. 
Although the financial sector’s share in domestic profits fell drastically during the first few 
years of the Great Recession, by 2018 it has recovered. Data from the European Union (EU) 
shows that non-financial firms’ share of total corporate profits stands today at around 40 
per cent.
Financialised accumulation profoundly affects how the economy works. If companies can 
make more from trading financial assets than by manufacturing products, they may choose 
not to invest in new technology; or they may spend on expanding their finance department 
to the detriment of other areas. The result is that financialisation has been shown to have a 
negative impact on ‘real’ investment. The trend is clear: where higher profits can be made 
through financial speculation, productive investment tends to decline. 
It is sometimes argued that financialisation in the Global North simply reflects the shifting 
of production and manufacturing activities to the Global South, which leaves predominantly 
financial functions in the ‘home country’ of multinational corporations’. However, Krippner 
found that US multinationals’ profits from foreign financial activities have increased more 
than profits from overseas production. In other words, US companies appear to be bringing 
their ‘financialised’ practices with them to other countries. In sum, corporations are not only 
reaping profits from relocating production to poorer countries, but also increasingly from 
a boom in financial activities overseas.
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8. How are non-financial firms, such as  
 supermarkets, changing in the context  
 of financialisation?
Many non-financial companies have themselves ‘metamorphosed’ into ‘financial rentiers’. 
A retail giant like the UK supermarket Tesco may buy up large areas of land, speculating 
that rising prices mean it can sell the land later for a profit, without ever building a new 
outlet. Similarly, Sainsbury’s – another UK supermarket chain – now offers insurance and 
banking services to its customers. Such is the involvement of large (ostensibly non-financial) 
corporations in finance that many have their own departments specialised in financial 
activities. For example, in the case of Enron (discussed below), financial assets were such 
a central element in their business strategy that the company building had its own trading 
floor.
Non-financial firms, particularly manufacturing companies, have increasingly relied on 
financial income streams. According to one study, US non-financial firms’ financial returns 
(measured by ‘interest and dividend income as a percentage of internal funds’) grew from 
20 per cent for most of the 1960s to a high of over 50 per cent from the late 1980s to the 
early 2000s.
Around the same period, US non-financial corporations began to invest more in financial 
assets (like stocks and bonds) than they did in their own non-financial assets (like machinery). 
The value traded on foreign exchange markets in less than a week  
is more than what is sold in goods and services in an entire year!
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Their proportion of financial assets relative to ‘real assets’ increased from around 30 per cent 
in the 1970s to over 100 per cent in the early 2000s. Various case studies – examining coffee 
traders, oil companies, agribusiness and car-assembly firms – provide concrete evidence of 
the ‘financialisation of non-financial firms’ from across the world.
Lapavitsas argues that corporate financialisation ties in closely with their reduced reliance on 
banks for credit and their pursuit of profit from unused funds. In other words, corporations 
seek ways to both lend and borrow money and engage in financial markets directly offering 
‘lower costs’ and more ‘flexibility’ than going through banks. Gradually, non-financial firms 
developed financial ‘skills’ and ‘acquired functions that previously belonged to financial 
institutions’.
CASE STUDY
Enron and financialisation
Enron Corporation provides an emblematic case of the financialised firm. Originally 
focused on the distribution of natural gas and electricity, this energy company 
shifted to a more ‘innovative’ business model based on trading in the financial 
sector, especially in energy and weather derivatives. The media, academics and 
market analysts loudly applauded Enron’s creativity until its bankruptcy at the 
end of 2001. The financialised business model was not sustainable, leading 
Enron to engage in fraudulent activities. They used legitimate accounting devices 
for the illegitimate purpose of hiding debt and fabricating earnings in order to 
maintain optimism in the firm and sustain a rising share price, despite Enron’s 
poor performance. Although the Enron scandal is usually taken to be an example 
of criminal fraud and governance failure, it is also illustrative of the wider process 
of financialisation.
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9. How are public services affected  
 by financialisation?
Financialisation has changed the way governments provide public services. Intertwined 
with the neoliberal revolution, private financial markets have come to play a bigger role in 
public service provision and financing. 
Central to this is a shift from direct public ownership – where the government pays for and 
provides utilities like water, or services like health care and education – to a system of indirect 
public provision – where government often partners with private, for-profit providers. 
Though this involves more bureaucracy and bigger state spending, much of this money 
is shifted off the balance sheet. Simply put, the debt belonged to the private consortium 
rather than the state, even though it was taxpayers who would of course be footing the 
bill. It allowed politicians who did not want to raise taxes directly or borrow more directly 
to finance new infrastructure. It also hooks private finance into the mix, something that 
necessarily changes the priority and purpose of public services. 
One particularly important way in which public services have been financialised is through 
Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs). PFIs were started by governments in Australia and the 
UK in the early 1990s and flourished in the UK under Tony Blair’s New Labour government. 
In a typical PFI contract, a public authority (such as the UK National Health Service) signs a 
contract with a consortium of private companies that have responsibility for both raising 
the money to build public infrastructure (like a new hospital) and operating the service. To 
finance the up-front cost of building new public infrastructure, the private consortium will 
take out loans directly from banks. Since private companies borrow from private banks at 
a higher interest rate than most governments belonging to the Organisation of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), this is a more expensive form of financing. The 
consortium is able to repay its loans and pay its executive staff and shareholders from the 
regular government payments as stipulated in the contract. 
In 2018, the UK’s National Audit Office found that PFI contracts will cost government £200 
billion over the next 25 years and that the cost of privately financing public service projects 
can be 40 per cent higher than relying directly on government revenues. In the UK there are 
currently 716 private finance deals in operation, which cost £10.3 billion for the financial 
year 2016–17. The need to repay the expensive bank loans that have financed the projects 
leaves the government with few options but to lower costs, something that has seen the 
stagnation of public sector pay in the UK. 
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Another public service that has radically financialised is university education. As public 
sponsorship falls, universities have turned to global capital markets (as well as higher student 
fees) to obtain finance. Universities such as Cambridge, Cardiff and University College of 
London (UCL) have started issuing bonds on the open markets. Between 2013 and 2018, 
£4.4bn of UK higher-education bonds were sold into global capital markets. This money is 
then used to finance the building of new university infrastructure and in particular, building 
expensive accommodation (often designed to attract wealthier international students). This 
has seen the rise in of the rent charged for university-provided accommodation. 
This melding of private finance and public services has also affected the provision of 
social housing in the UK. As the state stopped directly financing the constructing of social 
housing, private housing associations were asked to carry out the work. As the level of direct 
government grant for building social housing also fell, housing associations – often acting 
with developers – have had to borrow directly from capital markets. In order to finance the 
repayments, housing associations are allowed to charge ‘affordable’ rents – up to 80 per 
cent of market value – rather than social rents. This has forced many people out of areas 
where they had once lived.
10. What is shareholder value and what  
  is its role in financialisation?
One of the most important aspects of financialisation is also one of the least understood: 
shareholder value governance. Over the last 40 years, non-financial companies have 
become obsessed with their share prices and seem to dedicate more resources to 
improving these than the products or services they sell. To do so, firms sell off divisions 
that are less profitable, fire staff, outsource services, and often spend vast sums buying 
their own shares.
The chase for high share prices and sound creditworthiness 
has made financial criteria – and financial experts and 
accountants – central to the strategies companies adopt. 
Accountants, not engineers, now decide what’s best for 
industrial companies.
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There are four main reasons why share price has taken on more importance.
First, there are the shareholders. Equity investors on financial markets have used the stock 
markets to force companies to prioritise shareholder returns above all other concerns; this 
is often called ‘shareholder value maximization’.
If shareholders feel managers are not achieving high enough returns, they will sell the 
equity and take their money to a company that does. This market pressure is supposedly 
exacerbated by the fact that ownership of corporate stocks is highly concentrated. If a big 
institutional investor decides to sell all its shares, share prices could tumble. In this way the 
stock market – supposedly – left managers with no choice but to obsess about share prices.
The reality, however, is that the big institutional funds, apart from a few isolated incidents, 
have not in fact been able  to force their will on non-financial companies. In the UK, for 
instance, the real returns to equity were just 4.7 per cent in 2015, a rate that has fallen 
consistently since 1999 and now matches the levels of the mid-1980s, when the focus on 
shareholder value had only just begun. The trend is similar in the US where dividend yields 
on S&P 500 listed equity now average little better than Treasury Bills. More often than not, it 
is easier for shareholders to go along with management’s decisions than to challenge them. 
Second, and more significant, are the managers. In a financialised environment where 
significant debt can be raised very quickly by issuing bonds rather than shares, managers 
found it far easier to acquire companies, restructure them and sell off divisions than to 
try and build long-term plans and improve productivity. Today, many corporations’ main 
priority is to borrow money quickly and easily and a high share price is a good route to 
creditworthiness. They have been backed by management consultancy firms who preach 
the need to ‘maximise shareholder value’. The chase for high share prices and sound 
creditworthiness has made financial criteria – and financial experts and accountants – central 
to the strategies companies adopt. Accountants, not engineers, now decide what’s best for 
industrial companies.
Third, is pay. Managers have tied their own salaries to share prices by paying themselves 
partly through stock options. So, when share prices increase, so do their own salaries. Top-
brass company insiders – like Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers 
(CFOs) – have seen their salaries swell enormously through financialisation. As James K. 
Galbraith noted: ‘The bosses of the top 350 firms US firms made an average of $18.9m in 
2017. That’s a ratio of 312-1 over the median worker in their industries. And a big change 
since 1965, when the ratio was just 20-1. About 80 per cent of the pay packet is in stocks.’ 
Clearly, with their own salaries on the line, there is an enormous incentive for managers to 
keep share prices high. 
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Overall, it is clear that financial markets have an enormous 
impact on corporate behaviour.
Fourth, is demand. The increase in share prices has also been boosted by general demand 
on the stock markets. This new demand is a result of the massive inflow of funds from 
households drawn into financial investment through pension plans or special saving 
schemes. Thus, as Froud et al. point out ‘with financialisation, stock prices are driven by the 
pressure of middle class savings bidding for a limited supply of securities’. This has made 
the underpinnings of recent shareholder gains extremely unstable. These authors even 
liken the operation of the US and UK financial markets to a giant Ponzi scheme: the income 
of existing shareholders largely depend on the continual entrance of new players.
Through financialisation the role of the stock market has changed. It is less a place for 
corporations to raise money and more a place where managers ‘cash out’ by selling off their 
equity to investors at inflated prices. 
Overall, it is clear that financial markets have an enormous impact on corporate behaviour. 
In the race to increase share prices many corporate managers have begun to mimic financial 
market conduct – changing the disposition of the company towards ‘short-termism’. 
Non-financial firms have chosen to seek new profit channels through financial activities, 
restructuring (such as outsourcing, takeovers and mergers) and financial engineering 
(such as share buy-backs or tax dodges), instead of investing in new products or improving 
productivity.
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Social impacts of financialisation 
11.  How does financialisation affect  
  the household? 
As a result of financialisation, households have become increasingly reliant on financial 
products to meet their needs and wishes. Debt is now a major source of funding for people’s 
everyday spending, especially in countries like the US and the UK, in the face of declining or 
stagnating real wages and unstable employment. 
In the past, productivity increases were tied to wage growth, which allowed for increased 
spending and thus, demand and growth. Over the last few decades, in contrast, demand 
(and hence growth) has become increasingly reliant on greater indebtedness. The reliance 
on loans, especially, has become habitual in many countries, the routine use of credit cards 
being an obvious example. Increasing use of and access to credit is sometimes treated as a 
symptom of affluence; however, it can also result from social pressures for maintaining or 
increasing consumption in vulnerable economic circumstances. Banks too have been keen 
to speculate on indebted households. Indeed, it was their efforts to turn to household debt 
as a new source of profit in the early 2000s that led to the financial bubble and consequent 
crash of 2008, leading to the Great Recession. 
Besides increased debt, households may be involved in financial markets through their 
insurance cover (health, home, car, life, unemployment), their pension plans, their savings 
schemes, their student loans and mortgages. 
As Montgomerie has described, retail banking innovations have integrated individuals and 
households into capital market networks even if they are not aware of it. For example, by 
securitising credit card and mortgage debt and selling these securities on international 
markets, retail banks brought consumers and households into direct contact with investment 
banking. This made consumer debt a very profitable and apparently secure activity and 
allowed for an increase in the credit available.
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KEY FACTS
Households in many countries are highly indebted. In 2015, household debt as a 
percentage of disposable income reached 150% in the UK, 110% in the US, 203% 
in Australia and 292% in Denmark. A large part of this is as a result of mortgage 
borrowing.
In Turkey, debt payments as a percentage of household disposable income rose 
from around 8% in 2003 to almost 55% in 2013 – here the marked escalation was 
in credit card and consumer spending rather than housing debt.
The mounting reliance of households on financial markets 
correlates with the total or partial withdrawal of state support 
such as pensions, social security, subsidised housing, health and 
education. It is about ‘the transfer of risk and responsibility from 
the collective to the individual’.
Households engage in financial markets not only as debtors, but also as investors. Since 
the 1980s and 1990s, many governments have been pushing for reforms encouraging (for 
example, with tax incentives) the adoption of private ‘individual retirement plans’. There 
has been a drift away from ‘pay-as-you-go’ or PAYG (where retirees or pensioners are paid 
with taxes and contributions from people currently working) towards ‘partially-funded’ 
or ‘fully-funded’ (in which contributions are invested in a fund, later used to pay benefits) 
systems. As such, retirement savings have been channelled into financial institutions that 
have profited greatly from the new income.
Even those countries such as France that maintain relatively large public pension systems 
have been gradually changing from PAYG to investing state funds in financial markets. At the 
same time, within companies, there has also been a shift from ‘defined benefit’ to ‘defined 
contribution’- type plans, which transfer risk from the employer to the employee. Under 
defined benefit plans, the employer or company provides pensions for its employees. It 
bears the financial risks and has to pay its workers as promised even when its investments 
do not perform as expected. With defined contribution plans, in contrast, individuals hold 
their own accounts that incur gains or losses depending on investment performance. 
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In sum, pension reform has converted many workers into 
investors with a direct stake in the performance of stocks  
and bonds.
All in all, households have become more closely involved in financial markets, which has 
implied a cultural transformation in which they are supposed to adopt a ‘finance rationality’. 
In making decisions about which pension plan to choose, the type of savings scheme to 
invest in, between variable and fixed interest rate loans, and so forth, the individual or 
family is expected to act as a rational financial actor, analysing and calculating the costs 
and benefits of different options. In short, the individual or household should behave as 
any other investor. Above all, the individual worker or household should allegedly assume 
financial risks and take responsibility for their own future.
Indeed, the mounting reliance of households on financial markets is the consequence of 
a total or partial withdrawal of state support for social functions, such as pensions and 
other types of social security, subsidised housing, health, and education. It is about ‘the 
transfer of risk and responsibility from the collective to the individual’. With this in mind, 
many governments and institutions have been aggressively advocating ‘financial literacy’ 
for everyone. Neoliberal discourse calls this ‘financial empowerment’. However, the result 
has been to ‘naturalize ideas about self-reliance and to depoliticize more specific questions 
about the privatization of risk’.
KEY FACTS
In the US, between 1976 and 2018, household debt increased from 45 per cent 
to 78.7 per cent.
Overall, total outstanding US credit market debt increased from 140 per cent of 
GDP in 1973 to 328.6 per cent in 2005.
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12. How does financialisation affect 
  employment and income inequality?
The effects of financialisation on investment extend to employment. Whereas in the past, 
new job opportunities and increased productive activity would have been an indication 
of economic well-being, in the era of financialisation share prices often rise following the 
announcement of job cuts. For example, in May 2014 Hewlett-Packard’s stock prices rose 
more than 6 per cent the day after it announced that it would cut between 11,000 and 16,000 
jobs. Furthermore, many businesses transfer the burden of capital market demands to 
their workers, slashing wages and adding, in different ways, to the growing precariousness 
of employment.
Real wage growth has been stagnating or declining in countries such as the US and the UK 
over the last 30 years. At the same time, managers and CEOs within the productive sector 
and top-level financial-sector employees have seen their salaries swell, in large part due to 
stock option pay and bonuses – contributing to growing income inequality.
KEY FACTS
One hedge fund manager received $3.7 billion in just one year of ‘work’, roughly 
74,000 times more than the average US household income.
US CEOs in the top 350 firms ‘earned’ an average of $18.9m in 2017 – a ratio of 
312:1 over the median worker in their industries. In 1965, the ratio was just 20:1. 
If the impacts are negative for labour when finance is ‘doing well’, they are even worse when 
it isn’t. Workers were the worst affected by the global economic crisis, or Great Recession. 
Not only did unemployment grow across the Global North, but wealth inequality also 
continued to rise. Thus, in contrast to the Great Depression when inequality fell because 
of declining asset values held by a minority elite, in the recent financial crisis asset prices 
recovered relatively quickly (in part due to the help of government bailouts) and the wealthy 
got by relatively unscathed.
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The difference between the global financial markets and 
an ordinary casino, as pointed out by Susan Strange, is that 
people choose whether or not to take risks at the card table, 
whereas ‘casino capitalism’ drags us all into the game 
involuntarily.
13. How did securitisation of mortgages lead  
  to the US financial crisis?
Mortgage-backed securities were at the heart of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. In basic 
terms, mortgage securitisation involves a commercial bank selling on a bundle of mortgages 
to an investment bank, which creates a ‘special purpose vehicle’ or ‘entity’ (SPV or SPE) that 
pools and then splices the income from these mortgage payments into securities to be sold 
to investors. Investors choose from securities with different risk levels and corresponding 
rates of return. The income generated by the mortgage payments are used to pay interest 
and principal to the lowest risk ‘tranches’ first; high(er)-risk tranches receive payments only 
if and when the other (preceding) tranches have been paid off.
This is called the ‘originate-and-distribute’ scheme: banks ‘originate’ the mortgages and then 
distribute them to others. This allows banks to shift credit risk off their balance sheet, plus 
the proceeds from the sale can be re-loaned onto other customers. Banks may also gain 
by charging fees for originating the mortgages. The investment bank earns the difference 
between what it paid for the bundle of mortgages and the amount for which it sells the 
securities. (In some instances, rather than selling on to an external investment bank, the 
commercial bank itself creates a SPV in order to conduct securitisation directly.)
US mortgage lending grew considerably between 2001 and 2006. Once demand from the 
more ‘creditworthy’ segment of the population was met, the market turned to the ‘subprime 
sector’ or the poorest homebuyers, enabled by securitisation techniques. 
As interest rates went up and house prices fell, people start defaulting on mortgage 
payments. A collapse of the subprime market on its own could not have caused a general 
financial crisis. A large part of the problem was mortgage securitisation: specifically, ‘particles 
of subprime debt […were] embedded in securities held by financial institutions across the 
world’. Furthermore, a lot of people had taken out extra loans by re-mortgaging their houses 
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on the basis of rising prices (known as ‘equity extraction’), which they were now unable 
to pay. Finally, many financial institutions had taken positions in ‘credit default swaps’ – a 
type of derivative seen as a means of hedging potential losses or simply speculating on 
the performance of mortgage-backed securities and other types of collateralised debt 
obligations. In this way, the financial system built layers of debt and bets on top of securities 
that ultimately depended on individual homebuyers paying their mortgages.
The political response of the US Congress to the financial crisis was to pass the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program or TARP, which provided up to $700 billion for buying up or insuring 
‘troubled’ financial assets. For Palley, the purpose was not necessarily to save investors from 
incurring loss, but to prevent a wider crisis, since under financialisation the fortunes of the 
broader economy depend on the financial system. Despite the US government’s injection of 
cash, the financial system remained reticent to lend and the ‘credit crunch’ dragged on. At 
the same time, financial institutions quickly recovered profitability and were not so reticent 
about paying out large ‘rewards’ to their top employees.
Impacts on food, agriculture  
and nature
14. How has financialisation shaped food, 
  agriculture and other commodity markets?
From the late 1990s, and especially in the wake of declining returns on equities following the 
dot.com crash, financial market actors took increasing interest in commodity derivatives. 
Commodities are raw materials or primary agricultural products, such as gold, oil, copper, 
coffee, cocoa, wheat, sugar or cotton. (Note that not all primary products are traded on 
international financial markets.) 
Derivatives are financial contracts that derive ‘value’ from the performance of some 
‘underlying’ factor, in this case agricultural commodities. There are four main types of 
derivatives: forwards, futures, swaps and options (see Jargon Buster). A derivative can be 
thought of as an insurance policy. For instance, if a sugar producer, unsure of the precise 
output it will have next year, wanted to be able to plan and budget carefully, it could sell 
a ‘future’ contract to a buyer who agrees to buy a certain amount at a given price. Both 
the buyer and the producer get certainty. This is something that has long been used to 
manage risk. 
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But rather than simply manage risk, financial market actors began to use commodity 
derivatives to speculate. Investors might choose, for example, to buy a load of futures 
contracts from an aluminium producer for lower prices today on the ‘bet’ that aluminium 
prices will increase in the future and they could resell at a higher price and pocket the 
difference. The increasing involvement of investment banks like Goldman Sachs in 
commodities led to a scandal in 2013. Goldman Sachs had bought a number of aluminium 
warehouses and delivery infrastructure. It then delayed delivery on orders to squeeze supply 
and drive up aluminium prices. 
Historically, commodity prices have tended to change in line with – and thus provide a 
good hedge against – inflation. This made commodities alluring to those wishing to protect 
against losses in other investments or to diversify their portfolios. The growing demand 
for commodity derivatives pushes up their prices, making them even more attractive to 
financial investors, creating a self-fulfilling cycle.
KEY FACTS
Investment in US commodity futures indices (baskets of exchange-traded 
derivatives on a variety of commodities) rose from an estimated $13 billion in 
2003 to $260 billion in 2008. 
By 2017, the notional value of outstanding Over The Counter (OTC) commodity 
derivatives stood at $1,401 billion.
The rapid growth in commodity derivatives trading was facilitated by deregulation such as 
the 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which reversed legislation implemented 
by the US government in the 1930s in response to the Wall Street crash. This, together 
with other decisions taken by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, weakened 
regulations and opened the door to speculative trading without supervision or obligatory 
disclosure. This deregulation resulted from lobbying pressures by large financial enterprises.
Just 2 per cent of commodity futures contracts end with 
delivery of the physical good.
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The increased participation of financial investors and speculators has led to changes in 
the way these commodity markets now work, to a certain extent ‘de-linking’ them from 
physical market conditions (i.e. actual supply and demand) and tying them more closely 
to movements in stocks and bonds. For example, index speculators take positions in 
commodities as an entire group; in other words, they do not usually make investment 
decisions according to supply and demand conditions in specific physical markets, but rather 
in relation to the performance of other financial assets. Such speculation is probably behind 
the simultaneous rise and fall of different commodity prices – not easily explicable by factors 
of supply and demand. Moreover, speculators have no interest in the commodities as such. 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), just 2 per cent of commodity 
futures contracts end with delivery of the physical good. 
The growth of commodity derivatives trading has been strongly backed by many policy-
makers and institutions such as the World Bank, which have shifted emphasis from the 
stabilisation of prices through international commodity agreements, centralised marketing 
boards and cooperative schemes, to ‘private, market-based, price risk management 
strategies’, especially derivatives trading. In practice, participation in derivatives markets is 
mostly limited to larger players, which do not just use derivatives to hedge physical positions 
(as a chocolate company might, for example, a futures contract to hedge or protect against 
the risk of rising cocoa bean prices), but also to derive a growing proportion of their profit 
from speculative trading.
The main problem with speculation in commodity derivatives is that it contributes to ‘real’ 
commodity price volatility. Labban argues, for example, that the price of oil is determined 
– to a considerable degree – by the sale of ‘fictitious barrels’ on financial markets. He shows 
how oil prices rose by over 60 per cent the first six months of 2008, reaching a high of $147 
per barrel, despite a ‘decline in demand and increase in spare production capacity’. In other 
words, changing valuations in derivatives markets – which often do not correspond to the 
underlying supply and demand conditions of a particular commodity – may be translated 
into swings in physical market prices.
It has also changed who can participate in trading and benefit from commodity trading. 
Many small-scale producers and traders, especially in the Global South, who previously used 
derivatives have now been excluded due to costs and lack of access. Also, their size means 
they can neither handle the large ‘lot sizes’ required on international exchanges, nor deal 
with the instability in prices. In other words, commodity derivatives apparently no longer 
even serve the purpose for which they were originally designed, which was to protect the 
traditional hedgers who have actual interests in the physical commodities. 
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CASE STUDY
Financialisation and Inequality in Coffee Markets
Examining the case of coffee in Uganda and Tanzania, Newman argues that 
financialisation has contributed to increasing inequality in terms of income and 
power in the commodity chain. Large international trading firms with sufficient 
funds, access, and knowledge to participate actively in financial markets have 
been able to gain from price volatility through speculation. Meanwhile, many 
medium-sized traders were unable to compete financially and went bankrupt 
or were subjected to take-overs. Finally, smaller (especially local) traders and 
producers tend to lose, as they must accept lower prices in return for stability or 
the risk implied by volatility.
15. What role did speculative trading play in  
  the world food price crisis in 2007–2008?
The impact of speculative trading on food prices has been particularly severe, though the 
extent to which speculation was to blame for the recent global food crisis is hotly contested.
The price of ‘internationally traded food’ goods rose by around 130 per cent between the 
beginning of 2002 and mid-2008. These rising food costs were especially difficult for people 
in the Global South, where food purchases represent 60–80 per cent of income. Following 
the food crisis, the number of people considered ‘undernourished and food insecure’ rose 
by approximately 75 million. The crisis led to civil unrest in more than 40 countries around 
the world and a significant increase in the costs of food imports for the 50 Least Developed 
Countries’ (LDCs).
Commodity prices fell sharply after June 2008, in conjunction with the financial crisis, but 
recovered barely a year later. Kerckhoffs et al. argued that the steady injection (2003 to mid-
2008) and then rapid withdrawal (late 2008) of speculative money in commodity derivatives 
markets were behind the inflation and the sudden bursting of the bubble. Since 2008, prices 
rose before falling in 2015 and picking up once more. Some argue that commodity prices 
are stabilising after a period of boom and bust. Yet it is clearly a site of speculation. 
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16. What is the financialisation of nature?
As financial innovations are used to extend and deepen commodification to more areas, 
it is not just primary commodities, but nature more generally, that is being financialised. 
Even immaterial ‘goods’ such as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have become tradable 
on financial markets.
The practice of emissions trading emerged in the US in the 1970s as an attempt to limit 
sulphur dioxide contamination through ‘market’ mechanisms. The idea behind ‘cap and 
trade’ is to create a market for pollution permits. In basic terms: a maximum pollution 
threshold is established (the ‘cap’ part), forming the basis for the creation of a limited number 
of permits, which can then be traded.
This trading takes many different forms (e.g. some involve pollution ‘offsets’, where a 
company can compensate for its own emissions by reducing them elsewhere, such as by 
investing in a reforestation or a renewable energy project), but the basic underlying principle 
is the same: to create market incentives for reductions in pollution. Supposedly, more 
environmentally ‘sustainable’ companies can gain by selling unused quotas, while companies 
with unsustainable practices lose because they have to pay for additional allowances.
Variations on this theme are used to ‘control’ air and water quality, and similar mechanisms 
have been designed (supposedly) to halt the exhaustion of marine life by creating tradable 
fishing quotas or rights. 
Once the initial markets have been created, this opens up opportunities for the development 
of derivatives (e.g. carbon options or proposed fishing ‘catch shares’ futures) that allow 
companies to hedge against, or speculate on, the prices of these tradable permits, quotas 
or credits.
The financialisation of nature is encouraged by market-oriented environmentalists and 
financial actors who see it as a new profit opportunity. However, in addition to debates 
surrounding the ethics of pricing and commodifying ecosystem ‘services’ and ‘goods’, 
growing evidence suggests that these financial ‘solutions’ fail to resolve environmental 
degradation and could actually aggravate the problem, as well as creating new social 
inequalities by putting the financial sector in control of common resources. 
In the case of fishing, for example, ‘financialised’ fisheries management is often based on 
dispossession – via the creation of privatised fishing ‘rights’ – and exclusion of subsistence 
fishing communities. Finally, there are fears that new forms of volatility and even crises could 
be unleashed in the wake of expanding ‘natural capital’ derivatives markets.
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Exploring the forces behind 
financialisation
17. How did financialisation become so  
  dominant?
Financialisation is not something that simply happened. Political decisions or non-
decisions permitted the process of financialisation to take off and continue apace. 
Although deregulation responded, in part, to ‘regulatory arbitrage’ and loopholes that 
some corporations were already exploiting, policies at the national and international levels 
also actively encouraged activities and changes that buttressed financialisation. 
Finally, inaction, such as the refusal to intervene in financial activities that are potentially 
destabilising, has been at least as important as active policy reform.
Neoliberal policy, in particular, bolstered financialisation. The focus in the last few decades 
has been on removing regulations on capital and corporations. Neoliberal advocates 
have also insisted on maintaining low inflation, as opposed to the post-war Keynesian era 
macroeconomic goal of maintaining full employment. The neoliberal approach has partic-
ularly benefited the financial sector because inflation erodes the value of financial assets. 
This agenda was pushed aggressively by national governments (such as during the Reagan 
Administration) as well as institutions such as the IMF. In the Global South, where it was 
not imposed by IMF conditions, it still often received backing from local elites. Examining 
the case of Argentina, Jiménez observes that neoliberal restructuring in the 1990s ‘reflected 
an alliance of political power between the state and transnational financial power at the 
expense of industry’. This created a boom in the mid-1990s followed by a bust in 2001.
Other governments became resigned to such economic policies, arguing that they have little 
choice in the matter. Once financial liberalisation has taken place and capital is unshackled 
from its chains, national policy autonomy becomes constrained as countries that fail to 
comply with investor interests are punished by ‘capital flight’ whereby investors withdraw 
their money to pursue greater returns elsewhere, or are unable to access private finance 
as they are no longer judged ‘creditworthy’ by international institutions and rating agencies. 
Many economists celebrate the restrictions imposed on public policy through capital 
mobility; Thomas Friedman, for example, calls this the ‘golden straitjacket’. In this view, 
capital mobility serves as a ‘disciplinary instrument’, forcing governments to adopt the 
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‘appropriate’ monetary and fiscal policies such as balanced budgets (which may require 
harsh austerity measures), low inflation, generous tax codes, and deregulated financial 
markets. 
Ironically, rules of fiscal austerity do not apply in an event of a financial crisis in which the 
government is expected to bail out private investors and institutions. In reality, market 
discipline dictates not the desired amount of government spending, but its desired form: 
budgets which include funds for health, education, or social security, for example, are seen 
as objectionable, while in the case of a financial crisis the government is expected to empty 
its purse.
The financial institution bailouts imposed by the US and various European governments 
following the 2008 crisis are good examples.
18. What regulations were put in place to  
  control financialisation after the global  
  financial crisis?
Financialisation is very deeply embedded into the workings of the contemporary political 
economy. While many might have assumed that financial crisis would herald a dramatic 
change in policy and restrictions on the kind of risky practices that led to financial collapse 
and taxpayer bailout, little has substantially changed.
The biggest shift has been an attempt to agree on guidelines to address ‘systemic risk’ to 
the financial sector as a whole, rather than targeting specific banks or specific practices. 
The most important initiative has been the Basel III framework, a set of global, voluntary 
regulatory frameworks, which banks are invited to follow. Though they were agreed in 
2010/2011 the date of implementation extended to 2019. The rules are largely based on 
improving the capital that banks hold in their balance sheets. This means decreasing bank 
leverage (proportion of debt to equity) and ensuring banks hold a greater proportion of 
low risk assets. 
In Europe, there was a political effort in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis to 
adopt a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) on certain kinds of financial securities, and to restrict 
the growth of asset-backed securitisation. These were pushed in particular by the European 
Parliament. Yet the European Central Bank (ECB) and the British government thwarted their 
effots and instead actively helped to rebuild an Asset Based Securities market and other 
securities markets that were supposed to be targets for an FTT. 
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The shadow banking sector – despite its role in the financial crisis – has been largely 
untouched. It continues to boom. The Financial Stability Board reports that the share of 
financial assets held by non-deposit-taking institutions reached almost 50 per cent in 2016. 
China is a particular cause for concern; its shadow banking industry is now worth $15 trillion, 
or about 130 per cent of GDP. The IMF, in a 2017 report on shadow banking, noted that 
‘risk has… shifted towards corners of the financial system where we have less visibility and 
fewer instruments to deploy’.
19. Why did the financial crisis lead to the  
  financial sector becoming more powerful?
Financialisation can be changed only by social movements that work to transform it. Though 
there have been important pockets of resistance, nothing as yet has been able to counter 
the power of oligopolistic banks, asset managers and politicians that have gained so much 
from financialisation. There are three key aspects to the power of finance.
First, direct power over policy-makers and regulators. The financial industry is huge, complex 
and has access to financial and informational resources, well out of reach of any other social 
class. In the run-up to the last US presidential election, the financial sector spent $2 billion, 
including $1.2 billion in campaign contributions – more than twice the amount given by any 
other business sector. A 2016 report by the Corporate Europe Observatory found that the UK 
financial sector spends over £30 million per year on lobbying in Brussels and employs more 
than 140 lobbyists to influence EU policy-making. Alongside these basic financial resources, 
the complexity of the financial sector gives it an informational advantage over regulators 
and policy-makers. Together this makes it hard for politicians to impose regulatory changes 
that would restrict the growth of financialisation.
Second, structural power over society. In a context of capitalist overproduction and decline in 
profits among OCED countries especially, debt-led growth is often the only way governments 
can raise the tax and borrowing needed to finance public spending and produce the growth 
rates necessary to satisfy citizens. The growing reliance on debt means that, regardless 
of what politicians may really want, they need financialisation to continue. This greatly 
empowers the two dozen or so investment banks at the centre of credit creation and is 
precisely why since the crisis new avenues of speculation have emerged like a bubble in 
collateralised subprime company debt. 
Third, infrastructural power. The final way in which finance retains a hold over society is 
that private financial markets, in particular the securitisation market are used by central 
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banks to implement monetary policy. That means in order to ‘govern the economy’ as a 
government must do, it must rely on private financial institutions. This gives the financial 
sector the power to resist changes. 
CASE STUDY
The Enron Lobby
Froud et al.’s case study of the ‘financialised’ US Enron Corporation is instructive 
on how politicians have, with impunity, colluded with corporations to support 
risky strategies of financialisation. Enron’s senior managers were from the Texan 
elite, with strategic national connections. Kenneth Lay, the CEO of Enron, was an 
expert lobbyist. Enron made donations to both political parties. These connections 
helped Enron push for the deregulation of the energy sector, especially in relation 
to financial trading.
For example, in 1993 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
exempted energy derivatives from government supervision. The Chair of the 
Commission at the time was Wendy Gramm, who left her position after making 
this decision and a few weeks later became a member of the Enron Board. Enron 
was also behind a legal reform ‘which limited the amount that companies would 
have to pay out as damages in the event of conviction’.
When Enron went into bankruptcy at the end of 2001, the same people who 
had received generous offerings from the firm were expected to investigate 
the company for fraud – 212 of the 248 Senators and members of the House of 
Representatives involved in committees investigating Enron’s collapse or the 
conduct of Andersen (Enron’s accounting firm) had received donations from one 
or both companies.
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Resisting financialisation
20. What is ‘financial democracy’ and why  
  is it problematic?
The growing involvement of ‘ordinary’ people in financial markets is sometimes celebrated 
as the dawn of a ‘financial’ or ‘investor’ democracy. Wealth is supposedly constantly 
redistributed from corporations to the millions of worker-cum-shareowners. Policies that 
favour Wall Street or the City now allegedly represent the public good rather than serving 
a narrow minority.
Yet only a small percentage of the population is able to invest enough savings for financial 
gains to be truly relevant. The impression made by the statistic of more than half of North 
Americans having a ‘stake in’ the financial markets quickly deflates given  that 40 per cent 
of shareowners hold only ‘negligible’ amounts in shares. Put differently, 70 per cent of US 
households own few or no stocks. In sum, most people do not benefit in a significant way from 
rising share prices or increasing dividend payments. Furthermore, the notion of financial 
democracy distracts from the fact that the sector is actually highly concentrated. If before the 
crisis many institutions were considered ‘too big to fail’, this only worsened with restructurings: 
by 2014 just five investment banks controlled 44.61 per cent of US financial assets. 
 
Still, the mere impression of financial democracy, regardless of the fact that it is not backed 
by the figures, consolidates the hegemony of finance: ‘As investors, many workers now 
appear to have a direct material interest in neoliberal policies such as capital mobility, price 
stability, low capital-gains tax and shareholder value’. In reality, the losses suffered by the 
majority under these policies are far greater than the measly gains obtained from them.
The financial democracy thesis is also questionable given that workers and large corporations 
are clearly unequal in the finance game. Most big firms cannot easily be taken advantage of 
by financial institutions since they have a similar level of power and access to information, 
but individuals often use finance to meet basic needs and may have few alternatives. For 
example, a company may take out credit as part of a calculated leveraging strategy in order 
to multiply gains, while an individual may have little option but to take on a student loan or 
use a credit card to pay for groceries. Furthermore, workers continue to be mere consumers 
of financial products, while large firms have the capacity not only to buy in the financial 
markets, but also to sell. Finally, ‘limited liability’ gives corporations exceptional power 
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compared to the individual household: unlike workers, shareholders’ homes are not seized 
in order to pay the debts of an insolvent company. There is clear evidence of this inequality 
if we look at the outcome of the Great Recession: many families lost homes and jobs, while 
governments used public funds – namely, tax revenue – to rescue many companies.
For Bryan, Martin and Rafferty, far from constituting a ‘financial democracy’, financialisation 
can be likened to an ‘enclosure’ of the household: ‘the realm of reproduction and domesticity’ 
has been converted into ‘a scene for further accumulation’. In many cases, households are 
forced to work more (for example, taking on extra jobs or doing overtime work) in order to 
sustain growing levels of debt. As argued by Lapavitsas, there is an evident contradiction 
at the core of this phenomenon’: the growing reliance of banks on extracting profit from 
workers’ income corresponds with stagnating real wages.
In practice, ‘financial democracy’ has meant the money of the many fuelling the profits of 
the few.
21. How can financialisation be resisted?
Financialisation has imposed new pressures on everyday life and made old pressures worse. 
But it has also opened up new possibilities for resistance.
One is debt itself. Just as striking coal miners in the UK used their access to the engine of 
the economy at the time – coal – to flip the balance of power and demand better conditions, 
so now debtors can use their access to credit by declaring a debt strike. A refusal to accept 
unfair quantities of debt lumbered on people in financialised economies could force 
creditors to back down or change their terms of payment. In early 2015, a group of 15 
US students refused to pay back the student loans they took out to attend the for-profit 
Corinthian colleges. Outstanding student debt in the US is over $1 trillion and organisations 
like Strike Debt and the Debt Collective hope to organise mass refusals to help counter the 
debt-laden financialised norms they live under. 
Refusing repayment and demanding a write-off of debt have a long history. Anthropologist 
David Graeber’s thorough history Debt: The First 5000 Years shows how debt jubilees have 
been common since the debt slates were wiped clean in ancient Mesopotamia.
Another route of resistance is the attempt by campaigners to foster solidarity and a sense of 
collective identity among debtors. Rolling Jubilee, a collective that grew out of Occupy Wall 
Street, is using the financial markets to this end. It is organising debt jubilees by collecting 
donations to buy distressed personal debt (money that banks have given up trying to collect) 
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at discount on the secondary debt market. Instead of allowing it to fall into the hands of 
debt collectors, the group steps in, buys the debt and writes it off. Those who have had 
their outstanding loans cleared are then encouraged to donate to keep it moving. Because 
the debt is worth much less than the value of the initial loan, they are able to buy up large 
quantities. By August 2018, Rolling Jubilee had raised over $701,000 to write off almost $32 
million of distressed debt. They hope that such actions will make even more radical debt 
strikes possible.
Another way to exercise pressure on large banks is by moving your money to smaller 
institutions with different operating logics. The Move Your Money campaign created a 
‘Bank Ranking Scorecard’, which ranks UK banks and building societies according to criteria 
including ‘honesty, customer service, culture, impact on the real economy and ethics’ in 
order to help people decide where to open an account. 
Crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending, in which individuals lend or donate directly to the 
project or enterprise of their choice, is also a means of bypassing large financial institutions. 
However, the growing popularity of these schemes puts them at risk of corporate takeover; 
in this sense, it is worth investigating how different platforms operate before jumping on 
the bandwagon.
There are also a number of different campaigns aimed at addressing the problems wrought 
by financialisation. Most of these campaigns focus on lobbying governments to regulate 
specific aspects of the financial industry. For example, the US ‘Stop Gambling on Hunger’ and 
the European campaign against ‘Food Speculation’ (which combines the work of a number of 
civil society organisations (CSOs) and NGOs) have been pressing for the introduction of new 
rules to reverse the financialisation of agricultural commodity markets. The latter campaign 
contributed to the EU’s decision to impose position limits, capping the number of contracts 
on agricultural commodities that any one financial trader or group of traders can hold. 
Unfortunately, opposition to the regulations, especially from the UK government, watered 
down the agreement and left key loopholes open. There are also multiple campaigns for 
implementing or strengthening more general financial transaction or Tobin taxes, aimed 
at stifling speculation.
We have outlined just a few channels through which financialisation is being challenged. 
Throughout history, people have responded to coercion in creative and unexpected ways. 
Just as financialisation is a recent historical phenomenon, so resistance to it has only just 
begun.
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Jargon Buster
What an individual or company owns is their ASSET. A house is an asset, as is crude oil. 
Financial instruments – such as stocks and bonds – can also be considered assets. People and 
companies can use assets as the collateral for a loan. Yet if asset prices fall, then the value 
borrowed may be more than the value of their property and they could face bankruptcy if 
they cannot repay their loan.
In the CARRY TRADE, firms borrow in one currency at a low interest rate in order to lend 
or invest in another with a higher interest rate (to profit from the differential). Because 
interest rates tend to be higher in ‘developing’ countries, these have become a key target 
in the carry trade, especially those with appreciating currencies (a tendency reinforced by 
the inflow of capital caused by the carry trade). If, or when, the carry trade – and, as such, 
the inflow of capital – is reversed (perhaps due to a sudden loss of confidence or a rise in 
interest rates in the funding country) it can cause enormous upheaval – with some actors 
suffering bankruptcies while others, such as hedge funds, profit. The Asian debacle of the 
late 1990s is the most cited example of the destructive impact of a carry trade ‘unwinding’, 
but it also played a role in the 2008 global financial crisis.
CURRENCY DERIVATIVES – the majority of foreign exchange (FX) trading is accounted for 
by Over the Counter (OTC) derivatives contracts. Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system, an increasing number of countries have abandoned fixed or pegged exchange rates 
and allowed – at least to a certain extent – the value of their currencies to be determined 
by market supply and demand. This implies constant fluctuations in exchange rates, which 
pose risks for firms across the globe. These companies may use FX derivatives as a sort of 
insurance (a way to ‘hedge’) to protect themselves them from potential losses due to swings 
in the exchange rate. However, many investors use FX derivatives not as ‘insurance’ or a 
protection strategy, but rather to place bets on particular currency movements.
In a CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP (CDS), for example, the seller promises to pay the buyer for 
the value of a debt if the debtor defaults. For this, the buyer must pay the seller premium 
instalments. Unlike conventional insurance, it is not necessary for those involved in the 
derivative exchange to have any direct interest or involvement in the underlying debt. In 
short, using CDS derivatives, speculators external to a particular credit contract can make 
bets on the likelihood of default. These became very popular instruments during the 
financial bubble and played an important role in the crisis. Between June 2005 and June 2007 
the notional amount outstanding in CDSs rose from just over $10.2 trillion to $42.85 trillion. 
A few years before the crisis, Alan Greenspan, head of the US Federal Reserve, celebrated 
the development of the CDS market, while government ‘financial experts’ prevented these 
innovations from being regulated.
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DERIVATIVES are financial contracts that derive ‘value’ from the performance of some 
‘underlying’ factor. This underlying factor does not even have to be a ‘thing’: for example, 
weather derivatives allow one to hedge against or speculate on hurricanes, frost and 
snowfall, or the amount of sulphur in the air. Unlike securities, which imply a claim on future 
income streams, derivatives represent an ‘exchange of performance exposure, where 
gains and losses are expressed simply in the changing price of the derivative itself’. Most 
derivatives contracts are officially considered risk-management or hedging tools. Ironically, 
the use of derivatives to hedge against volatility has itself become a source of volatility, while 
speculation on derivatives markets depends on volatility for profit making. There are four 
main types of derivatives: forwards, futures, swaps and options. 
FORWARDS derivatives emerged from basic agricultural forward contracts, dating 
back to at least the 1600s; though centralised futures trading emerged much 
later, in the 1840s, with the establishment of the Chicago Board of Trade. In a 
‘conventional’ forward contract a producer (e.g. a farmer) promises to sell and a 
purchaser (e.g. a chocolate company) promises to buy a certain amount (e.g. 10 
tons) of a commodity (e.g. cocoa beans) at a fixed price (e.g. $3,000 per ton) on 
a specified date in the future (e.g. 1 June  2019). This helps the farmer ‘hedge’ or 
protect against low prices and the chocolate company to guard against high prices.
Standardised and tradable contracts offered by financial exchanges are known 
as FUTURES, though the underlying principle is the same as in a forward. Futures 
offer protection (via the exchange, essentially an intermediary) against the other 
party defaulting, unlike private forward contracts. In the case of commodity 
derivatives, they also use standard quantities (e.g. tons of cocoa beans) and usually 
apply ‘mark-to-market’ pricing.
‘MARK-TO-MARKET’, in the case of commodity futures, means that on a daily 
basis the contract is essentially ‘reset’ according to the prevailing ‘delivery price’ 
of the commodity in question. The party against whom the price is moving has 
to pay the price difference into a margin account (in which the investor deposits 
funds with the brokerage firm), while the counterpart receives that same amount. 
For example, if the original delivery price is $1,000 and the next day delivery 
prices are $950, the buyer’s margin account is debited the $50 difference, while 
the seller is credited with $50. The buyer would theoretically be paying $1,000 
(as in the contract) or $50 more than the prevailing market price ($950), i.e. the 
markets moved against his future contract position. The same applies in the other 
direction: if the delivery price went up to $1,050 then the seller would be debited 
and the buyer credited.
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OPTIONS As their name suggests, options contracts provide the ‘option’ to buy 
or sell at a certain price on a particular date, instead of an obligation to do so.  
For example, a cocoa producer might purchase a ‘put’ (sell) option contract for $100 
fee to sell at a certain amount to hedge against falling prices, while a chocolate 
company might purchase a ‘call’ option to buy a ton of cocoa at a certain price.  
A speculative trader would typically purchase a call (buy) option if they want to bet 
the price of the underlying asset will rise, or a put (sell) option to bet the price of 
the underlying asset will fall. The institution that sells (‘option writer’) the contract 
charges a fee as they are obliged to sell or buy at a certain rate.
LEVERAGE is the ratio of a company’s debt to the total value of its equity (assets minus 
liabilities such as loans or outstanding payments to a supplier). Increasing leverage means 
companies take on more debt despite the value of their equity remaining unchanged. A 
company may choose to use borrowed money to increase investment (with the aim of 
boosting profits) if credit is cheap and/or if the interest paid is tax-deductible. Leverage can 
prove risky (leading to default) if investments go wrong or asset prices fall – as in the 2008 
financial crisis.
The NOTIONAL VALUE is the value of a contract based on the underlying asset. As it was 
explained in Slate Magazine: ‘In other words, if my contract allows me to buy 50 barrels of 
oil and the current price is $100, its ‘notional value’ is said to be $5,000—since that’s the 
value of the assets from which my contract derives.’ This often produces a higher number 
than the ‘market value’. ‘An alternative way to measure the size of the derivatives market is 
to calculate the instruments’ market value—which refers to how much they would be worth 
if the contracts had to be settled today.’
OTC literally means OVER THE COUNTER, rather than through a formal exchange. Because 
OTC trading by definition does not take place through a formal exchange, it is much harder 
to monitor and regulate.
QUANTITATIVE EASING is a monetary policy whereby central banks buy long-term bonds 
from private investors, like pension funds or insurance companies, using newly created 
(digital) money. The aim is to inject liquidity into financial markets and keep interest rates 
low. Governments hope that this will encourage borrowing and jump-start demand in the 
economy. The Bank of England found, however, that gains from quantitative easing have 
mainly benefited the wealthy.
REPOS are a way of borrowing money. It is short for ‘repurchase agreement’. It works by one 
institution selling an asset (like a bond) to another, on the promise that they will buy it back 
(hence ‘repurchase’) it later. To make up an example, I could ‘borrow’ money from you by 
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selling you a laptop for £10, on the promise that I will repurchase it for £8 in a month’s time. 
The difference in selling and repurchasing price is like the interest on a loan. The asset (in 
this example a laptop) acts as collateral. If I don’t repurchase, you keep the laptop. REPOS 
are a crucial part of the way banks manage their liabilities. 
SECURITIES are tradable financial instruments that represent either a debt owed (such 
as bonds or collateralised debt obligations – CDOs) or equity implying a real or potential 
ownership stake in a firm or asset (such as stocks or stock options, which reserve the right 
to buy a stock at a certain price on a particular date). The term ‘securitisation’, however, is 
not typically applied to the creation of traditional stocks and bonds, but rather new types 
of financial instruments that convert an income stream – such as mortgage repayments or 
telephone bills – into a security to be bought and sold.
SHARE BUYBACKS or STOCK REPURCHASES are when a company uses its own (or borrowed) 
money to buy back its own shares on the open market. It does this because greater demand 
for shares pushes up their price, so companies can ‘artificially’ increase their stock prices 
by buying substantial portions of the shares themselves. Traditionally, companies issued 
shares to investors so that they could finance big investments, such as new factories. Now 
they spend their own money buying back shares just so that their price remains high. Share 
buybacks are also supposed to inflate share earnings (or dividends); fewer shares imply 
company profits are distributed between fewer numbers, or more earnings per share.
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Global financial markets have expanded massively in recent 
decades, dwarfing ‘real’ production and trade and impacting on 
multiple aspects of our economy, society and environment. 
The global financial crisis of 2008 sounded the alarm bells about 
the dangers of an unregulated financialised world, but hidden 
behind the seemingly impenetrable jargon of collateralised 
debt obligations and over-the-counter derivatives, it is hard to 
understand the nature of financialisation let alone know how 
to confront it. In the meantime, financialisation of our global 
economy has continued unchecked. 
This primer is a beginner’s guide to financialisation – explaining 
how it works, how it shapes our lives, the forces that lie behind 
it, and how we might start resisting processes that prioritise 
freedom for capital over human rights and democracy.
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